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Part of a special issue on “swarm methodology,” this paper, written by a swarm participant, 
reflects upon the purpose and value of this kind of interdisciplinary research methodology.  First, 
by way of a recognition of the interdisciplinary status of this paper itself, the question of what we 
hope to accomplish when we engage in conversations across disciplinary boundaries is broached.  
Second, a discussion of the practice of peer-review provides an approximate view of one 
paradigmatic understanding of how we produce a “conversation” within a given established 
research methodology.  We are then, third, able to consider a number of possible related ways in 
which we might understand the value of a conversation between research methodologies.  Finally, 
the common intuition that there is a concrete value specifically within a “holistic” or “synergistic 
approach” is addressed, and the swarm methodology put forth as a very likely place for such a 
value to emerge, if it is to emerge anywhere. 
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Preface 
I run the risk of being absurdly self-reflexive in the following, most especially in my preemptory 
reflection on self-reflectivity.  I am a philosopher writing for a journal oriented more towards the 
social sciences than the humanities.  Further, I am writing for a journal “for the Study of Race, 
Nation and Culture,” and I will not be discussing race, nation, or culture.  What am I doing here? 
That is the primary question:  What am I doing here – what conversation can we have; 
what can I offer to you, my reader, in this venue?  This is what I can offer:  my struggle with this 
very question.  What is my social identity qua the community of Social Identities?  By speaking 
in this venue, do I inevitably assert the foundational primacy of philosophy as a discipline?  This 
is, after all, not an uncommon form of arrogance in my field.  If not, how do I speak across this 
boundary?  What do we have in common? 
This is a special issue on a particular interdisciplinary research project which is oriented 
towards the social sciences, and does deal with race and culture.  As a participant in that project, 
I was always an outlier – my concerns different and more abstract than those of others.  The 
research which I have conducted based upon this interdisciplinary project has concerned an 
attempt to extend Adorno and Horkheimer’s discussion of the “culture industry” (2002 [1947]) 
from content to form; from entertainment media to consumer electronics themselves, and to 
begin to construct a kind of “phenomenology of the end-user.”  In the process of our 
collaborative work, I always held my view on process slightly under erasure.  The gap between 
my field and others was wider, and there was a constant question of whether my interests, 
concerns, and views were really valid for others, and worth bringing to the table as an equal 
partner.  
This, I still feel, is basically right.  My thoughts about consumer electronics in the context 
of Schopenhauer’s comparison between boredom and a bird of prey1 might be interesting to my 
colleagues in the social sciences, but it just simply isn’t useful to them, as the data and reflections 
on the data that they shared amongst one another clearly was.  So, a very real question 
throughout this process has been what, exactly, I was doing there – or, more generally, what do 
we think we can accomplish in truly interdisciplinary research?  Traditional research is deeply 
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grounded in disciplinarity – it seems that perhaps it is only because we focus both on topics of 
discussion and on a relatively few number of relevant approaches that we can, as a community of 
scholars, get work done without simply finding ourselves at sea every time we approach an 
object of study anew.  Disciplinarity being enforced through various methods of in-group 
definition and definitional exclusion, what research goal could be served by a purposeful 
transgression of these important functions of societies of researchers? 
So, while, in a way, I do want to make the philosopher’s claim of privileged knowledge – 
“I’m talking about philosophy of science, I can tell you something new about your own method” 
– I also intend to claim a sociological privilege:  insofar as I am a philosopher, I am a scholar; 
insofar as I am a scholar, I am a member of a community of research; insofar as I am part of a 
community of research, research is governed by social functions and norms; and, finally, insofar 
as research is governed by social functions and norms, the sociologist can rightly make the same 
claim of privileged knowledge.  Research is social, and my disciplinary identity is something 
which this project, in its interdisciplinarity, must make problematic.  
Now, I do not intend to try my hand at being a sociologist.  I will remain a philosopher, 
and I will take up my position as a philosopher by speaking about knowledge and methodology.  
But, in the following, I mean to also perform that transgression of which I will be, in the 
following, speaking.  My participation in this interdisciplinary research was always a challenge 
to disciplinary boundaries, and speaking of this challenge across disciplinary lines, I hope to 
illustrate the possible value of interdisciplinary conversations as much by the very process of my 
writing, and your reading, as by the actual argument which forms the content which I write, and 
you read. 
But this is more than enough of these Ouroborean considerations.  I have said the 
following is a performance of productive transgression of scholarly identity.  I can do no more 
than start the performance, and find out, in the process, whether I will have succeeded. 
 
Introduction 
The swarm methodology is, to the best of my knowledge, a monotypic genus – that is, it has 
been only attempted once.  We who are writing on this are doing so because we believe the 
method to be of a more general value, both as a particular method and as a case study that 
illustrates more general aspects of research methodology.  In this consideration, I hope to present 
to the reader this example as a possible paradigm case for a possible interdisciplinary 
methodology.  Whether or not this succeeds, a larger goal applies as well:  the consideration of 
this unusual case as telling us something about the goals, function, and value of interdisciplinary 
work in general. 
While writing on the subject in this very early stage of development has very clear 
disadvantages, this can be said in favor of writing on it at this point:  our example is at least easy 
to decide upon.  In January 2007, an interdisciplinary group of scholars gathered in Las Vegas to 
attend the annual Consumer Electronics Show.  The group consisted of scholars housed in 
Departments of Sociology, History, Journalism, Communications, Philosophy, and Science and 
Technology Studies.  We gained access to the industry-only trade show by obtaining passes as 
press, industry analysts, or purchasers for our firms – all of which were technically correct 
according to the CES definitions.  We descended upon the show, spreading out and blending into 
the expected social roles to varying degrees – this process of negotiating identity being part of 
the process of study itself.  Over the course of the day, groups of scholars met to compare notes 
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and reflections, and in the evenings the scholars met as a whole in order to compare data 
collected, and preliminary conclusions that we felt those data were pointing us towards.  These 
conversations varied in a number of ways, and their diversity and range can be illustrated by 
these examples:   
 
(a) recommendations of particular events and locations of general interest, e.g. the 
strikingly nostalgic “archaeological dig” display put on by Qualcomm;  
(b) reporting of data known to be of interest to the research of others, e.g. a report, from a 
scholar who is not pursuing data on representations of gender to a scholar who is, of 
the presence of a pink Tazer, described as “smaller, to fit in a purse;”  
(c) mention of data of interest, pursuant of seeking confirmation of a trend in the 
observations of others;  
(d) discussion of possible trends, following ‘hunches’ for which one scholar did not have 
sufficient data;  
(e) comparing notes on methods of gathering data, and notes on the applicability of data 
collected to quantitative or qualitative analytic methodologies; and  
(f) making plans for coordinating and organizing future data collection. 
 
A general method of “swarm research” is by no means established through this 
experimental attempt, but for the purposes of this paper, let’s describe it as follows.   A group of 
scholars from diverse theoretical perspectives and/or disciplines congregates on the location of 
an object of study.  They avoid a theoretically pre-determined perspective on the object of study 
as much as is possible, although the assumption is that the diversity of theoretical frameworks 
will result in different – perhaps radically different – conceptualizations of the object of study.  
They immerse themselves in the object of study, and then convene in order to share reflections 
upon the object of study, this two-stage process being repeated for several iterations.   
What would be the advantage of such a collective method?  To embark upon a path 
towards an answer, let us first look into a particular prominent and well-respected example of 
collective research methodology within both the social sciences and the humanities:  the peer 
review process.   
 
Peer Review and the Intradisciplinary Conversation 
Peer review seems relatively straightforward in the “hard” sciences, in one way at least:  peer 
review seems like an intuitive extension of the basic idea that valid experimental results must be 
replicable by different scientists in different locations at different times, as long as testing 
conditions are kept constant.  While the peer review process itself may not involve the attempt to 
verify or falsify experimental results, one important function of peer review may be understood 
as an enforcement of procedural norms which ensure that further studies can be relevant to the 
study in such a way that the results of further studies could count as either tending to confirm or 
to falsify the results of the study under review.  In making this claim, I am broadly, and perhaps 
boldly, ignoring all manner of controversy about the exact process by which “falsification” or 
“confirmation” occurs in the hard sciences, including the question of whether this is primarily a 
rational or systematic process at all.  My point here is very limited:  I mean only to claim that the 
view above seems to be a commonsense understanding of one function of the peer review 
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process from within a commonsense understanding of method in the hard sciences more 
generally. 
Now, in the social sciences, although this intuitive understanding is clearly relevant, its 
direct applicability is less obvious.  It is, for example, on the one hand, not clear that the Marxist 
sociologist will have something to say to the ethnomethodologist that will help her on her own 
terms, or vice versa; and, on the other hand, it is also not clear that it is epistemically responsible 
to conduct peer review only within rather than between such theoretical approaches to research in 
the social sciences.  In the humanities, the account of peer review that places its epistemic value 
upon the making possible of verification or falsification of results seems even further from the 
case. 
In saying this, I mean in no way to impugn the value of such peer review, but only to 
argue that to make sense of the value of this process, we must consider additional factors.  Most 
simply, we can provide a fuller explanation of the function of peer review by considering the 
policing of social norms within scientific communities as a means to exclude unacceptable 
deviations from definitive elements of group identity.  To some extent, this is a deflationary and 
merely descriptive account, but it clearly applies, for example, minimally, in the preservation of 
group identity through the exclusion of terminology considered by the profession to be 
unprofessional, racist, or sexist; or, more robustly, through the partitioning of kinds of discourse 
and subject matter, where, for example, explanatory accounts such as  
 
we are no longer living in a culture dominated by the image 
because we are the pure image (Kroker, 2002) 
 
will occur in some journals, and those such as  
 
As in the case of power, severity is evaluated at a point µ1 = (µ0+ 
γ), for some γ ≥ 0; yet the above holds because for values µ > µ1 
the severity increases (Mayo & Spanos, 2006) 
 
will occur in others, despite that either of these claims may be relevant to the work being done by 
a researcher housed in a Department of Philosophy, depending upon her area of research.  
In line with this observation, let us say that among the functions of peer review is the 
enforcement of institutional expectations regarding subject matter, investigative methodology, 
basic interpretive schemes, and so forth.  We may rightly ask what the epistemic value of such a 
process might be.  The most obvious explanation of the value of such enforcement of norms is 
that, by regulating the boundaries of the research program, we can ensure that the data collected 
are in a theoretical context sufficiently narrow to allow findings by one scholar to be relevant to 
the research of another scholar within the same program, thereby approaching the possible 
intuitive purpose of peer review within the hard sciences previously discussed.  In other words, 
even in the humanities, it can be asserted that the enforcing of these norms allows for the kind of 
relevance and consistency from one study to the next requisite for one article to be able to 
support or oppose another.  While falsification and verification are, in many cases, inappropriate 
terms here even on a loose interpretation; nevertheless, without some constancy of framework, 
we cannot even make sense of successive articles as being in dialog with one another. 
Yet this constancy of framework must be rather variable, for it is clear that the idea of an 
interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal is at least not incoherent.  Let us then say merely that this 
 6 
constancy can take place at differing levels, or in differing kinds of frames.  Differing views can 
be profitably compared  
 
(i)  within a research program;  
(ii)  between research programs but within disciplines; or  
(iii) between disciplines but within a range of subject matter.   
 
It is in this last case where I believe the special value of swarm methodology is to be found.  To 
explain this, however, we’ll need to make clear how we can make sense of this vague talk, above 
about “constancy at differing levels or frames.” 
To illustrate this, consider a variety of methods of surveilling an area.  With a number of 
standardized, say, ceiling-mounted cameras, the kind of information provided at each point is 
constant, and the data can be combined in a purely meriological way, assembling a large picture 
through the spatial continuity of information.  Here, the cameras are only numerically distinct, 
and a greater or lesser number of them determines the granulation of information resultant.  That 
is, since there is no significant increase of information provided through overlapping fields of 
view, the more cameras we have, the more each can focus in on a small area, and thereby 
provide more detail.  Alternately, redundancy may be desirable, perhaps due to the 
untrustworthiness of the cameras, or their tendency to malfunction.  Here, where we have 
assumed that the devices have been standardized, this could be the only reason why overlapping 
coverage would be desired. 
Secondly, we might imagine a different approach, wherein we use different methods of 
recording the same information.  We might imagine using a number of different brands of 
camera or film, or, perhaps, different kinds of sound recording (for example, a hidden 
microphone vs. a boom microphone vs. a shotgun microphone).  In this case, there would be a 
different obvious reason for overlapping coverage – namely, that preference for such an 
arrangement, rather than the fully standardized devices in the first example, above, might be the 
result of an uncertainty regarding the best way of gathering the data of interest. 
Thirdly, we might have several entirely different kinds of information-collecting devices 
– that is, devices collecting data not just using different methods, but collecting different kinds of 
data; whose connection is overlapping, but incommensurable.  For example, if we have normal 
video cameras, infrared cameras, and audio recorders, each will provide data related through a 
common referent rather than a common informational structure.   
Among studies within a given theoretical approach we (roughly) want to gather data 
using investigative tools that are calibrated to one another, in order to ensure that there is a 
contiguity of data, and a clear applicability of results in one study to expected results in a 
neighboring or overlapping study.  Thus, the first example above can be used as an analogy.  
When engaging in a study spanning rival theoretical approaches, a primary question of interest 
may be one of the relative fidelity of rival methods.  Given that we are interested, for example, in 
questions of the social meaning of gender, what differences do we see through the lenses of 
structuralism vs. constructionism?  This corresponds to the second example above.   
In interdisciplinary research, the situation seems to be more in line with the third 
example, for the question of interest is not clearly one of fidelity, but more likely is a question of 
what shows up in a given general spectrum, and whether and to what extent those data 
correspond to data in another general spectrum.  The different “lenses” of rival approaches are 
relevant to one another as rivals insofar as we assume that they frame the object of inquiry in the 
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same manner, and, hence, that they offer necessarily mutually exclusive accounts.  Hence, I may 
ask, “As a sociologist, which account ought I to prefer in this kind of investigation?” in the same 
way that I might ask, “As a photographer, which film speed ought I to prefer in this kind of 
shoot?”  The incommensurability of audio vs. video recording consists in their non-rivalrous 
relation, namely, that no matter how excellent my video, and how poor my audio, the excellence 
of the one cannot replace or replicate the data from the other.  Each has its own sphere or 
spectrum of data, and we usually are interested in such incommensurate approaches, not in order 
to maximize accuracy, but to maximize comprehensivity.  After all, if I seek accurate 
information, I likely know what kind of information I seek, and, thus, the relevant question is 
what kind of e.g. camera to use, not what kind of recording simpliciter.  The question is one akin, 
instead, to “As a sociologist, I wonder what biology, psychology, or economics can tell me?”  
The answer may be challenging, confusing, or unexpected, but it will not be rivalrous – it will 
not be a direct challenge; there will always be a process of comparison and translation before 
obtaining any results which can validate or question any particular prior claim. 
Now, this picture is, of course, an oversimplification, and, indeed, so much so that I must 
remedy this to some extent before moving any farther.  The picture above is predicated upon a 
view of the disciplines that assigns a singular and unitary object of inquiry to each.  Sociology 
studies society.  Physics studies . . . physical objects.  Chemistry studies, well, chemicals.  
Obviously such a picture is absurdly simplistic – one of the things at issue in rivalrous 
approaches within the disciplines is the definition of the proper object of study, and the 
circularity of each of these simplistic definitions is unhelpful at best.  To use an example from 
above, the difference between the understanding of gender in structuralism versus in 
constructionism is not merely one of method, but, indeed, the object of inquiry is depicted by 
each as an entirely different kind of thing.  Furthermore, this is not merely an idiosyncrasy of the 
social sciences – hearkening back to Kuhn’s discussion in Chapter X of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, we might just as well ask whether Aristotelian physics or impetus theory 
better describes the motion of the pendulum; the pendulum, as an object of inquiry, only exists in 
one of the two systems (1970, p. 120).   
So, to correct the oversimplified view above, we should have to keep in mind that some 
different perspectives lumped under the same disciplinary heading may have an incommensurate 
relation to one another.  Such intradisciplinary breaks may, indeed, be more extreme than 
interdisciplinary differences – for example, a Continentalist philosopher may very likely have 
more in common, both in terms of methods and objects of inquiry, with a theorist in sociology 
than with another philosopher across a intradisciplinary divide – for example, one concerned 
with contemporary metalogic.   
Thankfully, our goal here is not to describe the relationship between paradigms and/or 
between research programs, or to describe how those differences might correspond to 
disciplinary definitions.  We embarked on this line of inquiry in order to delineate some ways in 
which research may be organized into different kinds of conversations.  Despite the incomplete 
and problematic nature of the delineation above, I believe it will provide sufficient grounds to 
point out the possible benefits native to the swarm methodology, and to begin to consider the 
kind of circumstance in which this methodology may provide a distinct epistemic benefit. 
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The epistemic value of intermethodological conversations 
Now, taking our admonishment, above, into account, let us say more modestly that it is at least 
coherent for us to differentiate between these different kinds of conversation between scholars: 
 
(1) Intramethodological studies, whose data are meriologically related 
(2) Rivalrous intermethodological studies, whose data are of a kind2 
(3) Non-rivalrous intermethodological studies, whose data are incommensurate 
 
The first kind of conversation is simply the standard furtherance of a research program, 
broadly construed.3  The second kind of conversation is presumably primarily of interest where 
the most useful or appropriate approach to a given topic is unclear.  What, then, is the purpose of 
the third kind of conversation, and when are we likely to benefit from it? 
To find such a case, it seems at first that we must rule out any conversation whose goal is 
to choose one or more preferred perspectives over relevant alternatives, for this would imply a 
kind of rivalry between the views, and a kind of commensurability which would justify the 
sufficiency of one perspective to disregard another.  It was said before that no matter how poor 
the sound quality and how excellent the video, the one cannot play the role of and replace the 
other.  Yet, consider surveilling an unlit windowless space.  Here, the video supplies only 
darkness.  Now, admittedly, audio on its own could never present this information, but, still, we 
have grounds to say that the subject matter is such that audio is more relevant than video.  Even 
though the results of the one method, indeed, cannot replace the results of the other, it is still the 
case that the one method is fecund, and the other sterile.   
Parallel to this, let us now say that one kind of motivation towards this third kind of 
conversation can be described as 
 
(3)a.  A conversation in which it is to be determined which 
perspectives are relevant to the object of inquiry; and to distinguish 
between perspectives from which the object is of interest, and from 
which is it not. 
 
This kind of inquiry is one that seems to be engaged in infrequently, perhaps for good reason.  
We may rightly ask what kind of object of inquiry could be so indeterminate as to make such a 
conversation to be of value.  We will return to this question after we have identified other 
varieties of this third kind of conversation. 
To return to the audio/video example, we may imagine that a regular pattern becomes 
apparent in one data set, but not the other.  In this case, the regularity in the one provides a clue 
relevant to the other, even though it does not tell us anything directly about any particular data 
present or absent.  An occasional 60-cycle hum in the audio might lead us to look for slight 
changes in light levels consistent with a florescent light out of frame, which we may not have 
otherwise noted.  In this case, the information from the one set does not provide us with anything 
that could replace data from the other, but indicates an area of potential interest within the other, 
thus constituting relevance without commensurability.   
Parallel to this example, we might imagine 
 
(3)b.  An intermethodological conversation in which it is hoped 
that the various perspectives will gain an advantage for their 
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independent, preexisting, and continuing intramethodological 
inquiry. 
 
In addition to the two possibilities considered above, we should not ignore the possibility 
of a holistic value – in our example, that we may not be so much concerned with either audio or 
video, in particular, as with gathering as full a record as possible.  Even though we might 
intuitively accept the value of this holism, it isn’t immediately clear exactly what kind of 
epistemic value might be found in an intermethodological conversation that does not fall under 
either (3)a. or (3)b. above.  Let’s look at a couple of possibilities. 
We might understand the epistemic value of a holistic perspective as reposing in further 
study at a later date, wherein we justify recording everything we can through the future value of 
the archive.  This, however, is a variety of (3)a., for the implicit basis of this potential future 
epistemic value is an assessment such as:  “I think I know what’s interesting here, but I’ll keep 
everything, just in case I’m wrong.”  
Perhaps we can turn to this example instead:  it has been well documented that persons 
watching debates on television assess them differently from those listening on the radio.  There 
may be some emergent epistemic value in the multiple modes of access – in this example, visual 
as well as auditory.  The version of holism in this example, however, may be a variety of (3)b., 
as we may account for the differences in perception not through emergent knowledge, but the 
mere highlighting of patterns within one mode of access through observation of a pattern within 
the other mode of access, as, for example, the viewer’s observation of the sweat on Nixon’s brow 
may lead her to interpret his speech as containing uncertain rather than qualified claims, or anger 
instead of conviction.4 
Although our use of analogies seems to be failing us here, nevertheless, it is a commonly 
enough held belief that there is some kind of holistic, synergistic, or emergent benefit to 
interdisciplinary or intermethodological engagement that we should include this as a possible 
goal of non-rivalrous conversation between incommensurate perspectives, even though, at this 
point, we can give no substantive account of wherein that epistemic value might repose.  So, for 
the time being, we will give a third option only as 
 
(3)c.  A conversation the aim of which is neither within the 
compass of any of the methodologies employed, nor within them 
all in aggregate. 
 
Despite the purely negative nature of this definition, we will leave it as it is for now, and will 
return shortly to the question of how we can give determinate content to this possibility. 
Before we move forward, however, it may be of value to summarize the discussion thus 
far.  First, we considered a commonsense intuition of a function of peer review within the hard 
sciences, and established more firmly a parallel function of peer review within the social 
sciences and humanities:  to enforce norms which allow for relevance of work requisite for what, 
minimally, we might call a ‘conversation’ between scholars.  This discussion being predicated 
upon a shared methodology or research program, we then turned to the question of what this 
consideration of epistemic value might tell us about the epistemic value of ‘conversations’ 
between methodologies which are either rivalrous and of a kind, or are neither able to share data 
sets in a straightforward way, nor able to be clearly in contention with one another about the 
proper depiction of the object of study.  Finally, we then considered three ways in which we 
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might find epistemic value in this latter kind of conversation – one that employs diverse 
methodologies which are incommensurate and non-rivalrous.  Forms of such conversations 
which may be of epistemic value include:  (3)a. a study which determines which methodology is 
a good fit for the object of study, (3)b. a study which determines what one clues methodologies 
might offer one another in pursuit of their provincial goals, or (3)c. a study which brings about 
some emergent value, of an as yet undetermined nature. 
Having gone through all of this as a propaedeutic, we can now ask whether and to what 
extent this account of possible epistemic values of interdisciplinary or intermethodological study 
helps us offer an account of the possible epistemic value of swarm methodology. 
First, let us consider the possible epistemic value of swarm methodology in terms of (3)a. 
determining the relative values of methodologies and/or research programs regarding a particular 
object of study.  While we noted above that it seems like it would have to be an unusual 
circumstance in which the object of study would be so indeterminate as to find a value in the 
mere determination of the relevance of various methods or approaches, it seems like our 
particular case study is one such example.  When stepping onto the show floor, we, of course, 
each carried our own background and training with us, and this gave for each of us a certain 
range of objects and categories of interest.  In addition, while we tried to avoid approaching the 
show with a particular study or thesis in mind, we all of course carried with us our own 
preoccupations with certain subject matter; one scholar looking at the rhetoric of expertise in the 
marketing of high-end audio equipment, another looking at the structures of interface design 
which construct the user as consumer, and a third looking at representations of domestic life as 
related to consumer electronics. 
I do not think it is controversial to claim that it is a general expectation that, although a 
scholar may come to a given object of study with a perspective partially predetermined by her 
training and by her particular interests in some subject matters over others, nevertheless, there 
ought to remain a certain amount of responsivity to the peculiar nature of the object of study 
itself.  The purely quantitative macroeconomist who looks at cologne advertisements and refuses 
to notice the importance of constructions of sexuality and symbolic exchange, we may rightly 
say, has failed to be appropriately responsive to the particularities of the object of study.  We 
each, however, cannot be maximally responsive, for a legitimate and important aspect of our 
professional training is the sharpening of focus in certain areas to the exclusion of others.   
Given these hopefully non-controversial assumptions, a clear account of a possible 
epistemic value of swarm methodology can be put forth under (3)a. above.  Namely, that by 
increasing the number of scholars approaching a given object and the diversity of methods and 
subjects of interest within that group – assuming they are able to retain enough interconnection 
in order to find one another’s work relevant – we can expect an increased responsivity to the 
object of study. 
In order to make sense of this claim, however, we must take seriously the fact that, while 
these approaches may be in a wide sense ‘in conversation’ with one another, we have assumed 
that this conversation is truly intermethodological insofar as the respective data and analyses are 
incommensurable.  This assumption forecloses on the possibility that a straightforward 
comparison will be possible; that one might offer a representation simply wider in scope or 
accuracy than the other.  As noted above, this kind of study may produce clear results only in 
limit cases – cases parallel to video and audio surveillance of an unlit windowless room – in 
which case we can conclude that one mode of access seems to be sterile by comparison to 
another.  But, in this case, it is still far from clear what the epistemic value of this conclusion 
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might be.  If these are incommensurable in that the excellence of the one, no matter how great, 
cannot replace the data from the other, then there is still an irreducible value in each. 
 Indeed, to return to our primary example, nobody was under any illusions that philosophy 
might turn out to be a “better fit” to the object of study than sociology.  In a way, this might 
provide an added interest to the results of the presumptively more sterile mode of access, for 
when we expect interesting results from a study, it is fine and good to receive them, but when we 
do not expect interesting results, any results of interest could be considered as of greater value 
merely on account of their unexpected nature. 
 So, with regard to the possible epistemic value in (3)a., we may conclude that, while the 
swarm methodology might be a good way of answering this kind of question, it remains unclear 
when this question would be worth asking, and when an answer to it would be of any 
consequence, and to whom; but, nonetheless, that there is still some intuitive value in this notion 
of an increased responsivity with an increase of methodologies and research foci.   
Let us now consider whether we can articulate this intuition in terms of (3)b.  In this case, 
we would suggest that an epistemic value in the swarm methodology is that the increased modes 
of encountering the object of study would result in an increased overall responsivity to the 
object, due to the fact that differences in the fecundity of diverse modes of study allow for each 
mode, independently, to refine its own intramethodological approach to the object as informed 
by resonances found in alternate, incommensurate approaches.  Here, we can make sense of the 
seeming contradiction above:  in the one case, the fecund results from sociology can help 
philosophy orient its investigation, and, at the same time, the few but perhaps surprising results 
from philosophy might provide an invaluable clue to discovering an inobvious pattern within the 
purview of sociology. 
 This is, I think, a coherent way of making sense of the value which interdisciplinary and 
intermethodological conversations may have, and is also a view of the kind of epistemic value 
which swarm methodology may hope to present.  And, with this, I hope to have accomplished 
the basic goals of this article:  to show that swarm methodology presents valuable possibilities as 
a research method, and, further, to provide a more general analysis of the possible epistemic 
value of interdisciplinary research. 
 Despite that I hope these goals to have been reached, I still have more to say on the 
considerations we have begun here.  Namely:  we still have left to consider whether (3)c. is an 
empty set, and if not, what the nature of these conversations might be, and what kind of 
epistemic value is to be found within them.   
 
Emergent and Hybrid Intermethological Epistemic Value 
A primary worry in the philosophy of science has been the question of to what extent, and in 
what manner, our methodology predetermines our results.  It is this which led Karl Popper to 
claim that Freudian psychology and Marxism were not properly speaking “scientific” because 
their concepts and methods allowed researchers to avoid any interpretation of data which would 
call the basic theory into question (1957 [1945], pp. 81–84; 1968, pp. 33–37).  Kant held that the 
non-optionality of the perception of objects within space meant that we had no grounds to claim 
that space was real outside of our perception, for if it were not real, we would never know it 
(1990 [1781], p. 33).  Popper, in turn, warned of the pitfalls of theories which, if they are false, 
can despite this avoid recognizing any evidence of that falsehood; and which are therefore 
dogmatic metaphysics dressed as science (1961 [1934], pp. 34–42).  To extend this concern to a 
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different kind of case, we see a parallel concern in Negroponte’s concept of “The Daily Me,” 
(1995, pp. 152–4) further developed by Cass Sunstein in his Republic.com (2002, pp. 3–22). 
 Here, the worry is that, through the use of personal filters, we can control the information 
we receive in order to ensure that the news we read every day, and our informational diet in 
general, is geared towards our personal interests, and is presented from a perspective with which 
we are comfortable.  In this way, we can encase ourselves within informational cocoons, neither 
being challenged by different viewpoints or uncomfortable evidence, nor being able to reach out 
to and discuss things with our ideological opponents.   
 We can take these examples as limit cases for non-responsivity to objects of study.  The 
worry in each case is that, no matter how terribly wrong we might be, we might never know it, 
and, thus, our opinion formed using a method or research program which is non-responsive in 
this manner is in an important way a mere reflection of the method itself, rather than of the 
object it purports to describe.   
Both Negroponte and Sunstein also discuss a “Daily Us,” but the discussion of it, in each 
case, is rather more brief than that of the “Daily Me,” and it does not seem to be the same kind of 
thing for both authors.  Negroponte uses the example of traditional print news as a kind of Daily 
Us, for it is a kind of broadcasting rather than the narrowcast which I receive at my favored 
pundit’s blog (1995, p. 154).  Sunstein, in Infotopia, locates the voice of the Daily Us in some 
wikis (2006, pp. 10–11), in the wisdom of markets (2006, p. 15), and offers as an implicit 
definition of “the emergence of a Daily Us;” “a situation in which people can obtain immediate 
access to information held by all or at least most, and in which each person can instantly add to 
that knowledge” (2006, p. 219).  Negroponte’s Daily Us is a mass-market aggregate 
representation of various interests, as understood by a few experts (journalists and editors, in this 
case).  Sunstein’s Daily Us is an emergent, bottom-up representation of an object of study or 
interest, as understood not by any agents in particular, but, as it were, by the system qua complex 
system.   
Sunstein’s explanation of the success of many parts of Wikipedia is the same as Hayek’s 
explanation of the predictive success of futures markets:  that in situations where each of us has 
incomplete but, so to speak, better-than-chance perspectives on something, and where we are 
allowed to freely offer this information, the perspective emergent will converge on accuracy 
(Sunstein 2006, pp. 14–16).  In other words, Sunstein’s Daily Us has the advantage, described 
above, of increased responsivity through use of a diverse multiplicity of narrow perspectives. 
Now, as noted above, we cannot straightforwardly apply this kind of account to the 
question of the value of interdisciplinary and intermethodological study – after all, in the futures 
market, whatever the different methodology, the outcome is always either “buy” or “sell,” and in 
the Wikipedia article, the goal is uniform – viz. encyclopaedic – and individual additions of 
information are always either meriological or rivalrous.  Still, let us ask what kind of parallel can 
be made. 
The value of ‘many minds’ when their relation is merely additive and meriological is 
obvious, so we will turn immediately to consideration of a rivalrous interrelation.  Here, even if 
we admit to the worst possibilities of the insularity of theoretical perspectives and the theory-
ladenness of observation, we can see a kind of value in running such theories up against one 
another in a rivalrous fashion.  Namely, that, as Kuhn argues in the closing pages of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, at the end of such a competitive process, theories which are 
in some sense well-adapted to their subject matter are likely, overall, to win out (1970, pp. 171–
3).  Kuhn depicts a period of crisis in a science – i.e. a period in which the paradigm for research 
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in that science is unclear, and where there may be many rival possible paradigms – in a way that 
I will describe as a kind of hybrid swarm; a term from biology which refers to the variation 
within the offspring of hybrids between overlapping interfertile species.  Great diversity may be 
seen, especially among hybrids of hybrids.  Selective pressures, however, limit the success of 
these varied phenotypes, and the hybrid swarm undergoes speciation.  Similarly, returning to 
Kuhn, after some time in a period of crisis, one of the paradigms in contention emerges 
victorious.  This, Kuhn takes pains to point out, does not necessarily mean that progress in a 
teleological sense has taken place; just as the lineage emerging from a hybrid swarm is simply 
the one best adapted to its local environment, not necessarily being the “best” or “fittest” in any 
wider sense, so also the new paradigm emerging from a period of crisis is the solution best 
adapted to the local crisis, and is not necessarily the most truth-conducive.   
This allows us to give a picture of a kind of artificial or induced crisis:  imagine that, in 
approaching a research question within a given paradigm, we apply a variety of different analytic 
methods, and then utilize whichever gives the most clear and/or useful data set.  In this case, 
while departing from Kuhn somewhat, we can still make out some relevant parallels.  The 
overall meta-methodology is similar to the function of natural selection within a hybrid swarm; 
we simply employ methods across the diversity of relevant alternatives, and see which is most 
adapted to the object of inquiry.  There is also a similar limitation in the strength of the 
conclusion about methodological preference that can be drawn from this meta-method:  all we 
know is that, given this object, this particular method yielded particularly easily interpretable 
results, or results particularly relevant to the hypothesis being pursued.  In the end, we have no 
real evidence about which method was most accurate to the object, nor do we know which is to 
be preferred more generally. 
 If we remove this rivalrous relationship between methodologies, we have left in our 
analogy only the hybrid swarm, without the selective pressure of the environment.  This picture 
corresponds to interdisciplinary and intermethodological conversations, as defined above, for 
when we are between methodologies or research programs, there is no presumption of what 
counts as a result, and no presumption of what the primary object of study might be, just as, in 
the hybrid swarm, there is only a diversity of differing attributes which might or might not be 
adaptive, depending upon the circumstances in which it is placed.  The hybrid swarm may have 
one member with redder flowers, another more fragrant, and a third more numerous.  The swarm 
on its own has only diversity, and it is only once we see, in the environment, that it is e.g. bird-
pollinated, that we discover redness, being more easily perceived by the pollinator, to be more 
adaptive than the other traits.  Similarly, as in (3)b. above, the conversation between disciplines 
and methodologies – the hybrid swarm – reaches results only once we return to the local 
selective goals of a particular coherent method or program.   
 To make sense of a different kind of value to be found in the hybrid swarm, let’s imagine, 
not a particular environment with selective pressures, but instead a nursery. Instead of allowing a 
local environment to select the most locally adaptive, we will allow a plant breeder free reign in 
determining which attributes she wishes the resulting plant to exhibit.  What might she value?  
Well, likely these values might have considerable overlap with adaptive traits in various 
environments, but her concerns may be quite different.  If developing a variety for laboratory 
work, she may wish to select for a quick life cycle, and high rate of germination.  If developing a 
variety for retail sales, she may wish to select for some other attribute, such as bright, attractive 
blooms.  But, the most interesting possibility, she may choose to preserve what Darwin referred 
to as a monster or a sport – some phenotypic variation that would not be adaptive under the 
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selective pressure of virtually any natural environment.  This, in fact, has happened often in the 
history of plant and animal breeding.  Selecting a weak and sickly specimen, but one which 
exhibits some otherwise unseen trait or combination of traits, is a longstanding practice.  
Examples include the extra retrices which Darwin points to as that minor phenotypic variation 
that was selected for by pigeon breeders in the origination of the fan-tailed pigeon, or the 
distinctive dark blotches on Phalaenopsis blooms which gave rise to the breeding of ‘Harlequin’ 
varieties.  The sport or monster, once the trait is stabilized, can be bred back with or grafted on to 
standard stock in order to increase the vigor of the offspring, while retaining the unusual 
characteristic.   
 It is this which is finally able to give us a kind of image of a value peculiar to (3)c.  An 
interdisciplinary and intermethodological exchange may be valuable for the particular new clues 
for future research, or ‘hybrid vigor,’ which may be brought back into a particular methodology 
or research program, or ‘local selective pressure.’  But, if there is any peculiar value in the 
‘hybrid swarm’ which is not to be found in the return to disciplinarity, it must be something like 
a sport – only something like a sport could offer a value which is neither within the compass of 
any of the methodologies employed, nor within them all in aggregate.  The sport is not adapted 
to any particular natural environment, nor is it the compromise of the breeder – i.e. vigorous and 
vibrant; fragrant and fecund.  Instead it is a new and emergent possibility, native to the hybrid 
swarm itself, and not merely to the sum of its parts. 
 This monster must be crossed back onto more typical plant stock in order to preserve the 
unusual trait while regaining the health and strength of a more generally fit member of the 
species – or, alternately, the sport must be grafted onto a more typical and robust rootstock.  
Similarly, the result of interdisciplinary and intermethodological research – if this value is really 
emergent from a synergy of incommensurate approaches, cannot be maintained in isolation.  At 
the same time, this is ex hypothesi not a case of the use of the hybrid in order to pursue pre-
established goals – this would correspond to (3)b., not (3)c.  Instead, just as we preserve the sport 
or monster through grafting or crossing onto parent stock, so in finding a new value in 
interdisciplinary and intermethodological research and choosing to preserve that emergent value, 
we must alter the parent stock; we must change our disciplinary environment, and change 
research norms used as a selective pressure.  In other words, if there is a lasting value to be found 
in the swarm, that value would repose in the possibility of alteration of the basic objects and 
methods used within a given research program. 
 Thus we can offer this alternate account of the possible epistemic value of certain kinds 
of interdisciplinary and intermethodological work, and swarm methodology in particular:  
through taking a diversity of approaches to an object of study, we may discover some 
constellation of categories, across disciplines, which is of value not because it allows each 
disciplinary approach to better pursue its own object of study as methodologically defined, but 
rather because it allows each disciplinary approach the possibility to modify its own basic 
interpretive structure, through which it encounters its object.   
Let’s now return to the parallel with Cass Sunstein’s account of the emergence of 
knowledge from many minds which is superior to the knowledge which each has individually.  
Sunstein defends this, referring to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in cases where each of us 
individually have some method or other of providing an answer which is better than chance 
(Sunstein 2006, pp. 25–29).  In this kind of case, when we look at the answer which emerges 
from the aggregation and negotiation between these methods in forming the voice of the Daily 
Us, we find that we, taken together, are actually far more reliable than each of us taken 
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separately.  This, I suggest, is the kind of benefit which we, ultimately, might hope to see emerge 
out of a swarm methodology.  That all of us, together, might be able to, in our 
intermethodological and mutual casting about and intermingling informational feedback loops, 
encounter the object of study in a way which is methodologically superior to any of our 
individual methodologies.  This “method against method” – more precisely, this methodology of 
productive transgression of methodological boundaries, limits, and conceptual prefiguring – may 
reveal regional ontologies or conceptual categories more peculiar and proper to the object of 
study than would be possible through either any of the individual methods participating in the 
process, or all of these methods in aggregate. 
  
 With this, I can summarize and restate the results of this last and additional subsection.  I 
have here claimed that if there is anything of epistemic value which emerges from an 
intermethodological approach which is not to be found in the sum of its parts, it must be found 
not in the value which an approach can find within its own methodology with the help of an 
alternate approach – for this would not be this kind of synergistic emergent value – but must be 
an epistemic value constructed between approaches, the value of which resides in an opening or 
modification of methodological approaches.  I will not here claim that any such value is to be 
found.  I will claim only that if there is such an emergent value, its value would inhere in 
methodological and conceptual alteration and revision, and that insofar as we think that such a 
goal is of value, the swarm methodology represents a relevant approach.  As to whether this 
particular intermethodological engagement – the engagement which this paper itself has, as a 
performance, attempted – this is something I cannot judge. 
 
Notes 
1. “Life presents itself chiefly as a task -- the task, I mean, of subsisting at all, gagner sa vie. If this is 
accomplished, life is a burden, and then there comes the second task of doing something with that which 
has been won -- of warding off boredom, which, like a bird of prey, hovers over us, ready to fall wherever 
it sees a life secure from need. The first task is to win something; the second, to banish the feeling that it 
has been won; otherwise it is a burden.” (Schopenhauer, 2004 [1892]) 
2. I mean “of a kind” in a loose sense here.  In this use of terminology, I hope to make my argument more 
apparent to a general audience, even though it does a certain amount of conceptual violence to certain 
technical uses of these terms.  While, e.g. the Kuhnian will claim that the rivalrous aspect of different 
paradigms consists in part in their incommensurability, the Kuhnian will nonetheless concede that the fact 
that this incommensurability is an issue for these rivalrous paradigms indicates that they are of a kind in a 
larger sense.  So, Einsteinian physics is of a kind with Newtonian physics in a sense, for Einsteinian 
physics is concerned with objects of inquiry sufficiently similar to those of Newtonian physics to force a 
choice between them.  By comparison, Einsteinian physics is not in such a close relation to phlogiston 
theory, Freudian psychology, or French cooking.  To adapt this to Gestalt perception, the duck and the 
rabbit in the famous “duck-rabbit” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 194) are of a kind in this larger sense – in that 
their very mutual exclusivity results from shared constituent elements, even if those constituent elements 
appear under differing categories (e.g. pendulum vs. constrained falling) in each. 
3. From here forward, in keeping with the recognition of these inter- and intradisciplinary boundaries of 
varying strengths, I will be speaking of methodologies and research programs rather than of disciplinary 
norms or disciplinary objects of study.  In doing so, I will also be trying to navigate between various 
perspectives in the philosophy of science.  I intend the following argument to be applicable regardless of 
how one divides up the fundamental organizational units of scientific practice.  In speaking variously of 
methodologies, research programs, paradigms, and theoretical perspectives, I am trying to make an 
argument that will avoid siding with e.g. Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, etc.  In the end, however, the attempt to 
negotiate between these views may be a prefiguring of my eventual view, which is closer to Feyerabend 
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than the rest, at least insofar as the epistemic value of what is usually called ‘interdisciplinarity’ is 
concerned.  Most of these views, most of the time, are really viewed as being about the so-called “hard” 
sciences anyhow, so my taking some liberties is skirting around their debates will, I hope, be more easily 
forgiven than it might otherwise. 
4. This example, it should be noted, is unusual due to our prejudice towards attributing more importance to 
audio than visual in this case.  Whatever the matter of fact may be, tend to claim that appearance ought not 
to be terribly relevant to political office. 
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